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Abstract 
This paper tests the internal consistency of time trade-off utilities. We find significant 
violations of consistency in the direction predicted by loss aversion. The violations 
disappear for higher gauge durations. We show that loss aversion can also explain that for 
short gauge durations time trade-off utilities exceed standard gamble utilities. Our results 
suggest that time trade-off measurements that use relatively short gauge durations, like 
the widely used EuroQol algorithm (Dolan 1997), are affected by loss aversion and lead 
to utilities that are too high.  
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1. Introduction 
This paper studies the consistency of time trade-off utilities. The time trade-off is 
a widely used technique to elicit health state utilities. The EuroQol algorithm, a 
frequently employed algorithm to compute health state utilities, is based on time trade-off 
valuations (Dolan, 1997). Several studies provide empirical evidence that the time trade-
off captures individual preferences for health well (van Busschbach, 1994; Dolan et al., 
1996; Bleichrodt and Johannesson, 1997). Richardson (1994) and Dolan (2000) give 
theoretical arguments in  favor of the time trade-off.  
Inconsistencies in time trade-off measurements were found by Stalmeier in 
several studies. Stalmeier, Bezembinder, and Unic (1996), Stalmeier, Wakker, and 
Bezembinder (1997), and Dolan and Stalmeier (2003) observed preference reversals 
between direct choices and time trade-off judgments for health states of low quality, i.e. 
health states that are close to or worse than death. They attributed these reversals to a 
proportional heuristic that people use in answering time trade-off questions. These 
preference reversals do not occur for health states that are clearly preferred to death.  
The common endpoints in time trade-off measurements are full health and death. 
Stalmeier (2002) found inconsistencies in time trade-off utilities when the endpoints used 
in the elicitation vary. His findings indicate no problems for time trade-off measurements 
in which endpoints are held fixed, because he observed that the relative size of utility 
differences, which is the information used in cost-utility analyses, does not depend on the 
endpoints used. 
The above findings suggest that time trade-off measurements may be problematic 
for health states close to or worse than death and in analyses in which the endpoints in the   4
elicitation task vary. Time trade-off measurements that use health states clearly preferred 
to death and that do not vary the endpoints, which is the common case in cost-utility 
analysis, appear to be on much firmer ground. The present paper will show, however, that 
inconsistencies also occur in the latter case. What is worse, these inconsistencies are 
systematic and cannot be explained by random error. We show that the systematic 
inconsistency can be explained by loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, Tversky 
and Kahneman, 1991), the idea that people evaluate outcomes as gains and losses from a 
reference point and are more sensitive to losses than to equally sized gains. The 
inconsistencies in the time trade-off decrease with the gauge duration used. This finding 
has interesting implications for the use of the time trade-off in health utility measurement. 
It also suggests that the EuroQol algorithm leads to health state utilities that are affected 
by loss aversion. 
Two other recent papers have also performed consistency tests of the time trade-
off (Spencer, 2003; Clarke, Wolstenholme, and Johnstone, 2003). Both studies found less 
evidence of systematic inconsistencies in the direction predicted by loss aversion. These 
two studies used different designs than ours, however, which may partly explain the 
difference in findings. We discuss these studies in the concluding section of the paper. 
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we describe the consistency test 
used in the paper. In Section 3 we explain how loss aversion can explain why the time 
trade-off might violate the consistency test in a systematic manner. Section 4 describes 
the design and results of two experiments that test the consistency of time trade-off 
measurements. Section 5 concludes the paper.  
   5
2. The consistency test 
  Let (T,X) denote T years in health state X. The conventional procedure to elicit 
the time trade-off utility of a health state A is to specify some gauge duration T1 in A and 
to ask a client, a patient or a member of the general population, to specify the number of 
years T2 in full health (FH) so that he is indifferent between (T1,A) and (T2, FH). The 
time trade-off utility of A is then computed as 
T2
T1
 .  
  Even though the conventional procedure is standard in time trade-off 
measurements, we might as well measure the utility of health state A through an 
alternative procedure in which the number of years in full health is specified and a client 
is asked for the equivalent number of years in A. The elicited time trade-off utility should 
be independent of the procedure used. Otherwise, we would end up with two different 
time trade-off utilities for health state A and no grounds to prefer one utility over the 
other.  
The consistency test we performed was based on the above argument and 
amounted to the following. In a first round of experimental questions, described in 
Section 4, we asked participants to answer the conventional time trade-off question, i.e. 
to state the number of years in full health that they considered equivalent to T1 years in 
health state A. Suppose a participant indicates that he is indifferent between T1 years in A 
and T2 years in full health. Then we asked him in a second round of experimental 
questions to state the number of years T′ 1 in A that he considers equivalent to T2 years in 
full health, where T2 was substituted from the first round. The time trade-off method 
implies that T′ 1 = T1 except for random error.    6
  It is well known that the time trade-off assumes linear utility for duration. This is 
a restrictive assumption and several authors have proposed to adjust time trade-off 
utilities for time preference (Johannesson, Pliskin, and Weinstein, 1994, Dolan and 
Jones-Lee, 1997). It is important to note that our consistency test does not depend on the 
assumption of linear utility. All that is required is that indifference is symmetric (i.e. for 
all a,b, a ~ b if and only if b ~ a) and that participants prefer more years to less both in A 
and in full health. If these requirements are satisfied then the equality T′ 1 = T1 should hold 
regardless of the shape of the utility function for duration.  
Several studies have shown that there exist health states of low quality for which 
there exists a maximal endurable time: a duration beyond which additional life-years are 
valued negatively (Sutherland et al., 1982, Dolan and Stalmeier, 2003, Spencer, 2003). 
For such health states more years are less preferred and, therefore, our consistency test is 
not valid. 
 
3. Loss aversion 
  Bleichrodt (2002) argued that two other factors, besides, utility curvature, affect 
time trade-off utilities: scale compatibility and loss aversion (see also Spencer, 2003). 
Scale compatibility asserts that respondents tend to give more weight to attributes that are 
consistent with the response scale used in the elicitation (Tversky, Sattath, and Slovic, 
1988). In the time trade-off, the response scale is duration and scale compatibility implies 
that respondents will focus more on duration than on health status when replying to time 
trade-off questions. In our consistency test, the same response scale, duration, is used in 
both stages and scale compatibility, therefore, cannot explain failures of the consistency   7
test. Loss aversion, however, allows for failures of the consistency test as we explain 
below. 
  A formal theory of loss aversion was presented in Tversky and Kahneman (1991). 
Tversky and Kahneman argue that a person’s preferences depend on his reference point. 
Variations in the reference point will generally lead to different preferences. Tversky and 
Kahneman additionally assume that people are loss averse, i.e. that losses have more 
impact on preferences than similar sized gains. 
  In the first stage of the consistency test, a client is given the outcome (T1,A) and is 
asked to specify the number T2 of years in full health that makes him indifferent between 
(T1,A) and (T2,FH). A loss averse client will take (T1,A) as his reference point and will 
determine T2 so that the loss in duration from T1 to T2 is exactly offset by the gain in 
health status from A to full health. Figure 1 illustrates this indifference. IC(T1,A) denotes 
the indifference curve on which (T1,A) and (T2,FH) lie when (T1,A) is the reference 
point.   8
Figure 1: The Impact of Loss Aversion










  In the second stage, the client is given (T2,FH) and is asked to state the number T′ 1 
of years in A that he considers equivalent to (T2,FH). That is, the client’s reference point 
shifts to (T2,FH) and he will now determine T′ 1 so that the loss in health status from full 
health to A is exactly offset by the gain in duration from T2 to T′ 1. Because the client is 
loss averse, losses loom larger than gains and judged from (T2,FH), (T2,FH) will now be 
strictly preferred to (T1,A). This happens because the difference between T1 and T2, 
which was a loss in the first stage, now becomes a gain and thus by loss aversion gets less 
weight and the difference between A and full health, which was a gain in the first stage   9
now becomes a loss and hence gets more weight. Thus, by comparison with (T2,FH), the 
positive side of (T1,A), the difference between T1 and T2, gets less weight and the 
negative side, the difference between A and full health, gets more weight following the 
shift of the reference point. Hence, by comparison with (T2,FH), (T1,A) appears less 
attractive than in the first stage and, because (T1,A) and (T2,FH) were indifferent in the 
first stage, (T2,FH) will be strictly preferred in the second stage. Figure 1 illustrates the 
above argument. The shift in the reference point from (T1,A) to (T2,FH) makes the 
indifference curves more shallow. The new indifference curve is shown as IC(T2,FH). To 
restore indifference, T′ 1 must exceed T1 and thus loss aversion predicts that the second-
stage time trade-off utility 
T2
T′ 1








The participants were fifty-one economics students at the University Pompeu 
Fabra, Barcelona. They were paid five thousand Pesetas (approximately 30 Euro). The 
experiment was carried out in two personal interview sessions. The two sessions were 
separated by two weeks. Prior to the actual experiment, we tested the questionnaire in 
several pilot sessions. 
The health state we selected was back pain. We chose back pain because it is a 
fairly common health problem and participants were likely to know people suffering from 
it. To describe back pain we used the Maastricht Utility Measurement Questionnaire 
(Rutten-van Mölken et al., 1995), a slightly adjusted version of the McMaster Health   10
Utility Index. Table 1 shows the description of back pain. Full health was defined as no 
limitations on any of the four dimensions. 
 
Table 1: The Description of Back Pain 
Unable to perform some tasks at home and/or at work 
Able to perform all self care activities (eating, bathing, dressing) albeit with 
some difficulties 
Unable to participate in many types of leisure activities 
Often moderate to severe pain and/or other complaints 
 
In the first experimental session, the first stage of the consistency test was carried 
out. We asked five conventional time trade-off questions with the gauge duration of back 
pain fixed at 13, 19, 24, 31, and 38 years, respectively. We deliberately selected stimulus 
values that were no multiples of five. The pilot sessions showed that people have a 
tendency to respond in round numbers, e.g. multiples of five. Our selection of gauge 
durations intended to make this heuristic less salient. We also learnt from the pilot 
sessions that participants found it hard to perceive living for very long durations which 
exceed their life-expectancy. Therefore, we used durations that were substantially lower 
than participants’ life-expectancy. To avoid order effects, we varied the order in which 
the time trade-off questions were asked.  
Recruitment of participants took place one week before the actual experiment 
started. At recruitment, participants were handed a practice question. Participants were 
asked to answer this practice question at home. This procedure intended to familiarize 
participants with the time trade-off questions. Before we started the actual experiment, 
participants were asked whether they had experienced any problems in answering the   11
practice question. Participants were then asked to explain their answer to the practice 
question. This procedure allowed us to test whether participants understood the time 
trade-off task. In case we were not convinced that a participant understood the task, we 
explained it again until we were convinced that he understood the task.  
  Appendix 1 shows the formulation of the time trade-off questions. Indifferences 
were elicited by a sequence of choices, starting with extreme durations and converging to 
the duration for which the subject was indifferent. Bostic, Herrnstein, and Luce (1990) 
showed that a such a choice-based elicitation procedure is less likely to lead to 
inconsistencies in people’s preferences than a matching procedure. Participants reported 
their answers by filling in a table. At any time during the interview, participants were 
allowed to check earlier responses and to adjust these if desired. To try and avoid 
response errors, the participants were asked to confirm the elicited indifference value 
after each question. The final comparison was displayed once again and participants were 
asked whether they agreed that the two options were equivalent. In case they did not 
agree, we would repeat the elicitation procedure for that question. 
In the second session, the second stage of the consistency test was carried out. 
The indifference values for each of the five first-stage questions were substituted and the 
equivalent number of years with back pain was elicited. Experimental procedures were 
similar to the first stage. The experiment was part of a larger experiment. The presence of 
the other experimental tasks and the delay of two weeks between the experimental 
sessions make it unlikely that participants would recall their previous answers and would 
note the relationship between the two sessions.   12
Differences between first-stage and second-stage time trade-off utilities were 
tested both by the paired t-test and by the nonparametric Wilcoxon signed ranks test. We 
only report the results of the two tests separately if they yield different conclusions.  
Our experiment also permits two tests of constant proportional trade-offs, a 
central assumption underlying time trade-off measurements. Constant proportional trade-
offs implies that the time trade-off utility is independent of the gauge duration in the 
elicitation. Several studies find support for constant proportional trade-offs (Pliskin, 
Shepard, and Weinstein, 1980, Hall et al., 1992, Bleichrodt and Johannesson, 1997, 
Stalmeier, Wakker, and Bezembinder, 1997, Dolan and Stalmeier, 2003). Sackett and 
Torrance (1978) found negative evidence.  
Some authors have suggested that support for constant proportional trade-offs is 
at least partly due to a proportional heuristic (e.g. Dolan and Stalmeier, 2003).  The 
proportional heuristic asserts that in conventional time trade-off question (A,T1) versus 
(FH,T2), people tend to choose T2 as a proportion of T1, because it facilitates their 
choices. If people adopt this heuristic consistently then constant proportional trade-offs 
will be satisfied. In contrast with most earlier studies of constant proportional trade-offs, 
we did not use multiples of ten as the gauge duration. Therefore, if support for constant 
proportional trade-offs is indeed due to a proportional heuristic then we should expect to 
find less support for constant proportional trade-offs in our study where the proportional 
heuristic is less easy to apply. 
Constant proportional trade-offs could be tested by comparing the conventional 
time trade-off utilities with each other and by comparing the alternative time trade-off   13
utilities with each other. Significance of differences was tested both by analysis of 
variance and by the nonparametric Friedman test.  
 
Results 
  We excluded two subjects from the analyses because they were unwilling to make 
some tradeoffs. Seven other subjects were excluded because their choices implied that 
they did not always prefer more life-years to less. Hence, the results reported below are 
based on the responses of forty-two subjects. 
Figure 2 displays the conventional and the alternative time trade-off (TTO) 
utilities. The figure shows that the time trade-off fails the first three consistency tests 
(those in which the gauge duration in the first stage of the experiment is equal to 13, 19, 
and, 24 years respectively). The failure is in the direction predicted by loss aversion. In 
the other two tests (in which the gauge duration in the first stage of the experiment is 
equal to 31 and 38 years respectively) we found no significant difference between the 
conventional and the alternative time trade-off utilities.  
The findings on constant proportional trade-offs are generally negative. In the first 
test, the comparison between the conventional time trade-off utilities, we can reject 
constant proportional trade-offs by the Friedman test (P < 0.01), but not by analysis of 
variance (P > 0.10). In the second test, constant proportional trade-offs is rejected both by 
analysis of variance and by the Friedman test (P < 0.01). 
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Figure 2: Comparison Between Conventional





















  The second experiment served two purposes. First, it aimed to test the robustness 
of the findings from the first experiment in a new subject population and using different 
health states. Second, it aimed to compare conventional and alternative time trade-off 
utilities with standard gamble utilities. The results from the first experiment suggest that   15
time trade-off utilities are affected by loss aversion, in particular for short gauge 
durations. Bleichrodt (2002) argued that loss aversion leads to an upward bias in 
conventional time trade-off utilities. The question is how serious this bias is. The upward 
bias due to loss aversion may be useful to correct other biases in time trade-off utilities 
(Bleichrodt 2002). We included the standard gamble questions to get some insight into 
the extent to which the bias due to loss aversion is problematic. Many studies indicate 
that standard gamble utilities are biased upwards (Hershey and Schoemaker, 1985, 
Bleichrodt, Pinto, and Wakker, 2001). If the upward bias due to loss aversion would lead 
to conventional time trade-off utilities that exceed standard gamble utilities then this 
indicates that the bias is problematic. 
  The comparison between conventional and alternative time trade-off utilities and 
standard gamble utilities was partly motivated by the finding of Dolan et al. (1996) that 
time trade-off utilities exceeded standard gamble utilities contrary to the common 
observation that standard gamble utilities exceed time trade-off utilities. Dolan et al could 
not give a convincing explanation for this contrast in findings (Dolan, 2001). The results 
from our first experiment, however, suggest that loss aversion can explain these findings. 
Dolan et al used a relatively short gauge duration of ten years in their time trade-off 
measurements. Hence, the results from the first experiment suggest a relatively strong 
upward bias by loss aversion. If loss aversion indeed explains why Dolan et al. found that 
time trade-off utilities exceed standard gamble utilities, then we should expect to 
replicate their finding for short gauge durations, where the data from the first experiment 
suggested an important effect of loss aversion, but not for longer gauge durations, where 
the first experiment suggested that loss aversion was less important.    16
 
Design 
Participants were sixty-five economics students from the University of Murcia. 
They were paid six thousand Pesetas (approximately 36 Euro). The experiment was 
carried out in small group sessions with at most six subjects per group. Each participant 
attended three experimental sessions, one for the standard gamble questions, one for the 
conventional time trade-off questions, and one for the alternative time trade-off 
questions. The sessions were separated by at least one week. The time gap between the 
time trade-off questions was two weeks, as in the first experiment. Prior to the actual 
experiment, the questionnaire was tested in several pilot sessions using university staff as 
participants.  
  We used the EQ-5D health states 22122 and 22322. These states are described in 
Table 2. Throughout the experiment, the health states were labeled health state A and 
health state B. 
 
Table 2: The Descriptions of Health States A and B 
Health State A 
Some problems walking about  
Some problems with performing self care activities (e.g. eating, washing or dressing) 
No problems with performing usual activities (e.g. work, study, housework, family or 
leisure activities) 
Moderate pain or discomfort 
Moderately anxious or depressed 
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Health State B 
Some problems walking about  
Some problems with performing self care activities (e.g. eating, washing or dressing) 
Unable to perform usual activities (e.g. work, study, housework, family or leisure 
activities) 
Moderate pain or discomfort 
Moderately anxious or depressed 
 
Experimental procedures were similar to those of the first experiment: the order of 
the questions was varied, for each experimental task participants received a question to 
take home, they had to explain their answer to this question before the actual experiment 
started, and indifferences were elicited through a sequence of choices. A difference with 
the first experiment was that in each session they got one additional practice question.   
In the first experimental session the standard gamble questions were administered. 
Participants answered six standard gamble questions, three for each health state. 
Participants were faced with choices between Y years in health state A for certain versus 
a risky treatment giving probability p of Y years in full health and probability 1−p of 
immediate death. The starting value of p was set equal to 0.5 in each question. The 
selected gauge durations for Y were 13, 24, and 38 years.  
In the second experimental session, participants answered the conventional time 
trade-off questions, in the third session the alternative time trade-off questions. As in the 
standard gamble questions, the selected gauge durations were 13, 24, and 38 years. The 
experiment was again part of a larger experiment. Hence, recall bias is unlikely to have 
affected the results.   18
The second experiment yielded not only four tests of constant proportional trade-
offs (two for each health state) but also two tests of utility independence of quality of life 
from life duration (denoted utility independence for short henceforth). Utility 
independence is a central assumption underlying standard gamble measurements. It 
implies that the utility score from a standard gamble does not depend on the value at 
which duration is held fixed. If utility independence does not hold then the standard 
gamble cannot be used to determine the utility of a health state independent of duration. 
Bleichrodt and Johannesson (1997) obtained somewhat negative findings on utility 
independence.  
Utility independence could be tested by comparing the three standard gamble 
utilities that were elicited for health state A with each other and by comparing the three 
standard gamble utilities that were elicited for health state B with each other. Significance 
of differences was tested both by analysis of variance and by the Friedman test. 
 
Results 
  We excluded two and nineteen subjects from the analysis of health state A and B, 
respectively,  because their choices implied that they did not always prefer more life-
years to less. This left sixty-three and forty-six participants in the analysis of health states 
A and B respectively. More subjects had to be excluded for health state B, because B is a 
worse state than A. The worse a health state, the more likely it is that there is a duration 
beyond which subjects do not prefer additional life-years. 
   19
Figure 3: Comparison Between
Conventional TTO, Alternative TTO, and SG
Second Experiment
* denotes significantly different at alpha = 0.01 both by the paired t-test and by Wilcoxon's test


































Figure 3 displays the results. For both health states, the time trade-off fails the 
consistency test when the gauge duration equals 13 years. For a gauge duration of 24 
years, the time trade-off fails the consistency test at a significance level of 1% for health 
state A and at a significance level of 5% for health state B. In all these four tests, the 
discrepancy between first-stage and second-stage time trade-off utilities is in the direction 
predicted by loss aversion. For both health states, the time trade-off satisfies the 
consistency test, in the sense that we observe no significant difference between   20
conventional and alternative time trade-off utilities, when the gauge duration is equal to 
38 years.  
  For a gauge duration of 13 years, we are able to replicate Dolan et al.’s (1996) 
finding that conventional time trade-off utilities exceed standard gamble utilities. For 
longer gauge durations we find the more common pattern that standard gamble utilities 
exceed time trade-off utilities. These findings show that Dolan et al.’s findings are 
consistent with an upward bias due to loss aversion in the conventional time trade-off 
utilities. The standard gamble utilities always exceed the alternative time trade-off 
utilities. 
For health state A, the difference between conventional time trade-off utility and 
standard gamble utility is significant at the 1% level for a gauge duration of 13 years. For 
a gauge duration of 38 years, the difference is significant at the 1% level by the Wilcoxon 
test (P=0.006) but only at the 5% level by the paired t-test (P=0.022). We indicated this 
divergence in the figure by putting an asterisk in parentheses. The difference between 
alternative time trade-off utility and standard gamble utility is significant at the 1% level 
for gauge durations 13 years and 24 years,.  
For health state B, the difference between conventional time trade-off utility and  
standard gamble utility is significant at the 5% level for a gauge duration of 24 years by 
the paired t-test (P=0.023) but not by the Wilcoxon test (P=0.053). For a gauge duration 
of 38 years, the difference is significant at the 5% level by the Wilcoxon test (P=0.050) 
but not by the paired t-test (P=0.062). The difference between alternative time trade-off 
utility and standard gamble utility is significant at the 1% level for a gauge duration of 24   21
years. For a gauge duration of 13 years, the difference is significant at the 5% level by the 
Wilcoxon test (P=0.017) but not by the paired t-test (P=0.083). 
The findings on constant proportional trade-offs are mixed. For health state A, the 
comparison of the conventional time trade-off utilities supports constant proportional 
trade-offs (P > 0.05). However, constant proportional trade-offs is rejected for the 
comparison between the alternative time trade-off utilities (P < 0.001). For health state B, 
we cannot reject constant proportional trade-offs for the comparison of the conventional 
time trade-off utilities by the Friedman test (P = 0.085), but we can by analysis of 
variance (P = 0.034). For the alternative time trade-off utilities, constant proportional 
trade-offs is rejected both by analysis of variance and by the Friedman test (P < 0.001). 




We find inconsistencies in time trade-off utilities. These inconsistencies are in the 
direction predicted by loss aversion, but arise only when the gauge duration in the time 
trade-off is relatively low. For longer gauge durations, the time trade-off utilities are 
consistent, in the sense that they do not depend on the elicitation method. These findings 
appear robust with respect to the health state used. We are able to replicate Dolan et al’s 
(1996) finding that for short gauge durations conventional time trade-off utilities exceed 
standard gamble utilities. For longer gauge durations standard gamble utilities exceed 
conventional time trade-off utilities as is commonly observed in the literature. These   22
results are consistent with the hypothesis that loss aversion was the cause of Dolan et al.’s 
finding. 
Our findings on constant proportional trade-offs are rather negative. We find 
mixed evidence on constant proportional trade-offs in conventional time trade-off 
measurements. In alternative time trade-off measurements, constant proportional trade-
offs is violated. Utility independence is violated in both tests that we performed. 
 
Explanations 
An explanation why the difference between conventional and alternative time 
trade-off utilities decreases with duration can be that duration and health status become 
closer substitutes for higher durations. Several studies have shown that the effect of loss 
aversion decreases when attributes become closer substitutes (Ortona and Scacciati, 1992, 
Chapman, 1998). McNeil, Weichselbaum, and Pauker (1981) found that that health status 
and duration became closer substitutes for higher durations. They observed that people 
are unwilling to trade life duration for health status if duration is low. That is, for low 
durations preferences are lexicographic. If duration increases beyond a certain duration, 
people are willing to give up life duration for improved health status and this willingness 
increases with duration (see also Pliskin, Shepard, and Weinstein, 1980, Miyamoto and 
Eraker, 1988).  
Our findings on constant proportional trade-offs are to some extent consistent 
with the proportional heuristic. As expected under the proportional heuristic, we find less 
support for constant proportional tradeoffs than in other studies that used multiples of ten 
as gauge durations. Nevertheless, we find some support for constant proportional trade-  23
offs in the conventional time trade-off measurements. The clear violations of constant 
proportional trade-offs in the alternative time trade-off measurements suggest that the 
proportional heuristic plays no role there. 
  
Possible objections 
An objection against our study is that in both experiments we elicited the 
conventional time trade-off before the alternative time trade-off. This may have led to an 
order effect if people had no clearly defined preferences before coming to the experiment, 
but constructed their preferences during the elicitation task and benefited in the second 
session from their experience in the first session. We took some care to avoid the problem 
of preference construction. In both experiments, subjects received practice questions at 
recruitment. These questions were intended to induce subjects to think about trading-off 
life-years against health status.  
We are inclined to believe that our results are not seriously affected by an order 
effect. If the problem of preference construction occurred then it is less likely to have 
affected the results of the second experiment, because in the second experiment subjects 
answered the standard gamble questions first. They, therefore, already had opportunity to 
construct their preferences regarding the trade-off between life-years and health status 
before they answered the conventional time trade-off questions. The results from the 
second experiment were, however, similar to those from the first experiment. Moreover, 
it is hard to conceive of a systematic bias arising from an order effect. If anything, we 
would expect preferences to be less precise in the conventional time trade-offs, but not 
systematically biased. We observe, however a systematic difference between   24
conventional and alternative time trade-off utilities. That having said, it would clearly 
have been better to include both conventional and alternative time trade-off questions in 
the first experimental session. 
Another possible objection against our study is that we used a young population 
of students and that it is not clear whether our results can be generalized to the population 
at large. It is plausible that older people value remaining life duration differently from 
younger people. Such criticism emphasizes the need to try and replicate our findings in a 
more representative group of participants. While we agree with the need to replicate our 
findings, we do not consider the unrepresentativeness of our sample to be an important 
problem. Many studies show that health state valuations are robust and do not depend in a 
significant way on the representativeness of the study sample (see de Wit, van 
Busschbach, and de Charro, 2000 for a review). An indication that our results are robust 
is that, in spite of the unrepresentativeness of our sample, we were able to replicate the 
finding by Dolan et al., who used a representative sample, that for short gauge durations 
conventional time trade-off utilities exceed standard gamble utilities. For longer gauge 
durations we find the common pattern that standard gamble utilities exceed conventional 
time trade-off utilities. 
 
Other studies 
  As noted in the introduction, two other recent studies also examined the 
consistency of time trade-off measurements. Spencer (2003) found mixed evidence: in 
one test the time trade-off measurements were consistent, in the other test there were 
inconsistencies in the direction of loss aversion. Clarke, Wolstenholme, and Johnstone   25
(2003) found no evidence of systematic inconsistencies in the direction predicted by loss 
aversion. 
  Spencer (2003), like us, used a series of choices to elicit indifference durations. 
The conventional and the alternative time trade-off measurements in her study were not 
linked, however, and, as Spencer explains, besides loss aversion, time preference, scale 
compatibility, and maximal endurable time affect the difference between conventional 
and alternative time trade-off utilities. Moreover, these factors exert opposing influences 
on the difference between conventional and alternative time trade-off utilities. In our test, 
time preference and scale compatibility do not affect the results, as we have explained 
before, and we corrected for maximal endurable time by deleting those subjects who did 
not satisfy monotonicity with respect to life-years.  
  Clarke, Wolstenholme, and Johnstone (2003) used a discrete choice experiment in 
which each subject got only one choice. The most plausible reason for the difference in 
findings between our study and that of Clarke et al. is the difference in elicitation method. 
Even though we used a series of choices to elicit indifference, our procedure is closer to 
matching than Clarke et al.’s who used just one choice. It is well known that people use 
different evaluation processes in choice tasks than in matching tasks (Tversky, Sattath, 
and Slovic, 1988). Perhaps, loss aversion is more important in matching than in choice. 
 
Implications  
Many practical studies use relatively short gauge durations and our results suggest 
that the resulting time trade-off utilities are affected by loss aversion. For example, the 
widely used EuroQol algorithm is based on time trade-off questions that used a gauge   26
duration of ten years (Dolan, 1997). Based on our findings we therefore have reason to 
believe that the EuroQol algorithm is affected by loss aversion. This belief is sustained by 
the fact that we were able to replicate Dolan et al. (1996)’s findings for  a short gauge 
duration, but not for longer gauge durations.  
The question is then whether we should strive to avoid the effect of loss aversion 
on time trade-off utilities? We are inclined to answer this question in the affirmative and 
to consider loss aversion a bias that should be avoided in health utility measurement. 
Health utility measurement yields inputs for economic evaluation and medical decision 
making. The aim of economic evaluations and medical decision making is to help policy 
makers and patients to make better decisions. That is, economic evaluation and medical 
decision making are prescriptive techniques and health utility measurement serves to 
yield inputs for prescriptive decision making. A crucial requirement for prescriptive 
decision making is that the results of the decision process should not depend on the 
method that was used to generate the utilities. Equivalent ways to elicit health state 
utilities should give the same results. Our consistency tests examined this requirement for 
time trade-off utilities. As noted, we found that the time trade-off only satisfies the 
requirement for longer gauge durations.  
On the other hand, loss aversion is probably not the only bias that affects the time 
trade-off. An indication that other factors are also at work is that even though the effect 
of loss aversion (and hence the upward bias in conventional time trade-off measurements) 
is strongest for short reference durations, conventional time trade-off utilities are not 
significantly higher for shorter reference durations. Bleichrodt (2002) argued that some 
effect of loss aversion on the time trade-off utilities may be desirable to offset other   27
biases in time trade-off measurements. The question of how much loss aversion to allow 
is not easy to answer. Future research should aim to identify and quantify the biases in 
time trade-off measurements. We hope that the results from this paper will be helpful in 
designing such future work.  
We should simultaneously strive for the development of new utility measurement 
instruments. Ideally, economic evaluation and medical decision making should use utility 
elicitation techniques that are not susceptible to biases such as loss aversion.  
Finally, several studies have suggested that there exists a concave relationship 
between the standard gamble and the time trade-off and that it might be possible to obtain 
standard gamble utilities by adjusting time trade-off utilities for risk attitude (Miyamoto 
and Eraker, 1985, Stiggelbout et al., 1994). The results from our paper suggest that the 
relationship between time trade-off utilities and standard gamble utilities is complex and 
depends, among other things, on the gauge duration used. 
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Appendix 1: Formulation of the Back Pain Questions 
Suppose that you have 13 more years to live with back pain. In this question you 
are asked to state the number of years in full health that you consider equivalent to living 
for 13 more years with back pain. That is, you have to determine the number Y that 
makes the following two options equivalent: 
 
1. Living for 13 years with back pain. After these 13 years you die. 
2. Living for Y years in full health. After these Y years you die. 
 
Use the following table to answer this question. 
 Your  current 
situation is 1 






Years with back 
pain 
Years in full 
health 
I remain in 1  I am indifferent 
between 1 and 2 
I change to 2 
1 13  13       
2 13  0       
3 13  11       
4 13  2       
5 13  9       
6 13  4       
7 13  7       
8 13  5       
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